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The "Human Resumes" of Great
Supreme Court Justices*
David P. Bryden** and E. Christine Flaherty***
Compared to the bloody battle over Judge Robert Bork,'
the nomination of Judge David Souter to serve on the Supreme
Court generated little controversy. Yet in his own understated
way, Souter also contributed to the perennial debate about the
proper qualifications of Supreme Court nominees. Supporters
usually emphasize the nominee's legal credentials. Somewhat
less publicly, presidents, senators, and interested citizens have
also studied the political balance sheet. From time to time
questions have been raised about alleged lack of judicial tem-
perament (Brandeis)2 or ethical lapses (Haynsworth).3 The
Souter nomination raised a different issue: Can a bachelor
from a small town in New Hampshire be a good Supreme Court
justice? More broadly, what kinds of experiences shape the
character of the best justices?
This question was obliquely raised by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who consented to be interviewed by a television jour-
nalist about the Souter nomination. Noting that he had never
heard of Souter, Justice Marshall implied strong doubts about
his fitness. More explicit doubts were expressed by a distin-
guished law professor who contended, in an interesting "op-ed"
essay in The New York Times, that the Senate should examine
Souter's "human resume": it revealed, he said, little or no con-
* The authors wish to thank Professors John Cound and Michael
Zuckert for reading an earlier draft of this Essay and making several helpful
suggestions. We are also grateful to Laurie Newbauer, who typed many drafts
of this article.
** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
*** Third-year student, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. For a discussion of some of the theories of judicial selection that were
offered during the Bork hearings, see Bryden, How to Select a Supreme Court
Justice: The Case of Robert Bork, 57 Am. SCHOLAR 201 (1988).
2. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE 74
(1933).
3. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
ApPoINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 15 (2d ed. 1985).
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tact with the diverse races and classes of America.4 Traveling
in a small circle in New Hampshire, this bookish and reclusive
man had not acquired the deep understanding of our pluralist
society that a justice should possess in 1990.
I. EVALUATING THE JUSTICES
After all these years, one might suppose, scholars should
know what kind of background is conducive to excellence on
the Court. Sure enough, that question has been systematically
studied. In The First One Hundred Justices,5 Professors Albert
Blaustein and Roy Mersky published6 several essays, including
two evaluating the qualifications and performances of every
justice from Chief Justice John Jay, the first appointee of Pres-
ident George Washington, up to and including Justice Thurgood
Marshall. The study thus covered ninety-six justices.
To evaluate these justices, Blaustein and Mersky polled
sixty-five experts: law school deans and professors of law, his-
tory, and political science specializing in constitutional law. In
addition to many illustrious professors of constitutional law and
history, the roster of experts included specialists in other areas
with which the Court must deal - for example, criminal
procedure.
The experts were polled in 1970. Each received a ballot
that listed the ninety-six justices in chronological order. No cri-
teria for evaluation were provided. Instead, the experts "were
requested to grade all the justices in a continuum from A to E:
A for great, B for near great, C for average, D for below aver-
age, and E for failure."7 The responses, when averaged out, in-
dicated that twelve of the justices had been great, fifteen near
great, fifty-five average, six below average, and eight failures.
"In sum, [the experts] ... gave passing grades to eighty-two of
the ninety-six justices or more than eighty-five percent of those
evaluated. Fourteen of the justices, about fifteen percent, were
adjudged as something less than average."
4. Brooks, What About Souter's Human Resume?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,
1990, at A21, col. 2. Although Professor Brooks deserves the credit for the
idea, he was not alone in embracing it: other scholars, at the University of
Minnesota Law School and elsewhere, responded enthusiastically to the
concept.
5. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STA-
TISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978).
6. Some of the essays were written by other scholars.
7. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 37.
8. Id.
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In chronological order, the twelve "greats" were:9
John Marshall 1801-1835
Joseph Story 1811-1845
Roger B. Taney 1836-1864
John M. Harlan 1877-1911
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. 1902-1932
Charles E. Hughes 1910-1916 and 1930-1941
Louis D. Brandeis 1916-1939
Harlan F. Stone 1925-1946
Benjamin N. Cardozo 1932-1938
Hugo L. Black 1937-1971
Felix Frankfurter 1939-1962
Earl Warren 1953-1969
The eight "failures," again in chronological order, were:1 0
Willis Van Devanter 1911-1937
James C. McReynolds 1914-1941
Pierce Butler 1922-1939
James F. Byrnes 1941-1942
Harold H. Burton 1945-1958
Fred M. Vinson 1946-1953
Sherman Minton 1949-1956
Charles Whittaker 1957-1962
Having obtained the experts' evaluations of the justices,
Blaustein and Mersky, along with two political scientists -
Thomas G. Walker and William Hulbery,11 analyzed biographi-
cal data about the same justices in order to determine the cor-
relations between personal characteristics and judicial
performance. For this purpose, Walker and Hulbery gave a nu-
merical score to each of the justices who had been rated by the
experts: "greats" were assigned the score of five, "near greats,"
four, and so on down to "failures," who got a one. Using the
average "ability score" for the ninety-six justices (3.18)12 as a
standard of comparison, the authors were able to determine
whether justices with any particular background trait had been
above average or below. They suggested that their study might
enable us "to predict with greater confidence how well a person
will perform if he is appointed to the nation's highest bench."' 3
9. I&
10. 1& at 40.
11. Identified, respectively, as of the Department of Political Science at
Emory University and of the Department of Political Science at the University
of South Florida. I&L at 52.
12. I& at 54.
13. Id, at 53.
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A. CLASS ORIGINS
A logical place to begin is with the justices' class origins.
Souter's family was middle class. His father was an assistant
bank manager, and his mother worked in a gift shop.14 Most of
Souter's predecessors on the Court also came from at least
moderately well-to-do families. Although few would object to
middle-class nominees, one might surmise that an extremely
privileged background is a handicap in achieving the under-
standing of disadvantaged people that some believe is a prereq-
uisite to greatness. If the experts' ratings are correct, however,
this has not been so: the 81 justices from families with "high"
family socio-economic status had an average ability score of
3.22; the fifteen with "low-status" families had a slightly lower
average score of 2.93.15
Several of the great justices came from much more privi-
leged families than Souter. Roger B. Taney was the second son
of a Maryland tobacco planter,16 who had "always lived on the
same plantation, amid his slaves and material comforts."'17
When, in 1799, Taney was first elected to the Maryland legisla-
ture, it was primarily due to his father's prominence.' 8
Born into the Southern aristocracy, John Marshall Harlan
was the son of an attorney who was, "successively, Secretary of
State, Attorney General of Kentucky, and a Congressman."'19
He too grew up in the Southern manorial tradition, with house-
hold slaves.20
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a descendant of prominent
Boston Brahmin families. His father, a nationally-known phy-
sician and literary figure, was the first dean of Harvard Medical
School, author of important analyses of Homeopathy and Its
Kindred Delusions and The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever.
His poem, Old Ironsides, was credited with saving the historic
frigate Constitution. He helped found the Atlantic Monthly
and for many years was its leading contributor. His wife,
Holmes, Jr.'s mother, was the daughter of a justice of the
14. Carlson, An 18th Century Man, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 19-22.
15. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 55.
16. Gatell, Roger B. Taney, in 1 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES
OF THE UNrIED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 635 (1969). Except as otherwise attributed, we derived our biograph-
ical data about the justices from the Friedman and Israel volumes.
17. S. ASCH, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS GREAT JUSTICES 41 (1971).
18. G. WHrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 66 (1976).
19. S. ASCH, supra note 17, at 75.
20. Id
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state's highest court.2
John Marshall's mother, the daughter of a minister, was a
descendant of "a family that could trace its ancestry back sev-
eral hundred years and also trace its numerous progeny in suc-
ceeding generations of American history through such names
as ... Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and the Lees of
Virginia. '22 Marshall's father, Thomas, although not rich, was
a man of substance, connections, and responsibility: A boyhood
chum of young George Washington, the first American agent
for Lord Fairfax (who owned much of northern Virginia), a
tax-collector, a sheriff, a justice of the peace, a small but landed
Virginia farmer, the owner of twenty slaves (far fewer than the
Madison family's 118, but enough to make him one of the larg-
est slaveowners in his county), and a man who frequently was
elected to the Virginia House of Burgesses, where his wife's dis-
tant relationship to Thomas Jefferson and his own continuing
friendship with Washington - he often dined at Mount Vernon
- must have augmented his stature.2
Brandeis spent his early years in a Louisville, Kentucky,
home of comfort, culture, servants, and social concern.24 His
parents, German Jews, had fled to America after the failure of
the German revolution in 1848. His maternal grandfather had
led a revolution in Poland in the early nineteenth century, and
his uncle was a delegate to the Republican convention in 1860,
where he helped to nominate Lincoln. "Brandeis's father was a
grain merchant who made a substantial income but never per-
mitted the subject of money to be discussed in his home. '25
Brandeis was on social terms with the influential people of
Louisville and later, from the time he enrolled at Harvard and
during his practice, he met a succession of Boston bluebloods26
- Holmes, for instance, was an early friend. Brandeis's early
legal practice was primarily corporate, 27 although as the famed
"people's lawyer" of Boston he dealt with many issues of con-
21. G. WHrrE, supra note 18, at 156; ATLANTIc BRIEF LIvEs: A BIOGRAPHI-
CAL COMPANION TO THE ARTs 372 (L. Kronenberger ed. 1965) [hereinafter AT-
LANTIC BRiEF LIVES].
22. L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 6-7 (1974). The rest of
our description of Marshall's parents is derived from L. BAKER, supra, at 7-15.
23. Id at 7-15.
24. Mason, Louis D. Brandeis, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note
16, at 2043.
25. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 167 (1936).
26. S. ASCH, supra note 17, at 107.
27. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 170.
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cern to the working class.28
Cardozo's father was a judge of the Supreme Court of New
York, connected to the notorious Tweed Ring, who resigned to
avoid impeachment for improprieties.29 "His ancestors were...
successful businessmen, educators and patriots (who) generally
carried out the rituals of New York's upper class .... ,,30 On his
mother's side, Cardozo's forbears came from Portugal to
America in 1654. A maternal great-grandfather was a captain
in Washington's army; a great-great uncle was a rabbi who took
his congregation to Philadelphia after the British occupied New
York, and later officiated as rabbi at Washington's inaugura-
tion.31 Other ancestors included one of the first trustees of Co-
lumbia University, and the author of the famous inscription on
the base of the Statute of Liberty.32
Charles Evans Hughes, born to "a poor Baptist preacher"3
and a former school teacher, grew up without material advan-
tages, but in an intensely intellectual environment.34
Joseph Story was born at Marblehead, Massachusetts, the
oldest of eleven children of his father's second marriage. His
father was a physician who participated in the Boston Tea
Party.35
Harlan Fiske Stone was two when his family moved from
New Hampshire to Amherst, Massachusetts. The elder Stone
"had come to Amherst a landless trader" but this shrewd Yan-
kee amassed a fortune "through horse swapping, cattle buying,
farming, and doing anything by which he could turn a dollar,
including the employment of young Calvin Coolidge as his
lawyer."3 6
Hugo Black was born in the scrubby-pine, hill country of
east-central Alabama, the eighth child of a Confederate veteran
turned storekeeper, "a familiar-enough rural type, secret
drinker, rack-renting landlord, and usurious moneylender
(rates running to 50%) as well as a merchant. ' 37 Black's
28. Mason, supra note 24, at 2045.
29. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 211.
30. G. WHITE, supra note 18, at 254.
31. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 210.
32. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2287-88.
33. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 75.
34. I& at 76.
35. Dunne, Joseph Story, in 1 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at
435.
36. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 104-05.
37. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JuDIcIAL REVOLUTION 88 (1977).
[Vol. 75:635
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mother, a postmaster, came from a more socially-distinguished
family that could trace its roots to Thomas Addis Emmet and
the great days of the Irish bar. More recently, the family could
boast of a prominent California attorney and an actor who had
shared the stage with Lillian Russell.38 Although he was born
in a "good old-fashioned log cabin covered over with clap-
board,"3 9 and didn't get accustomed to inside plumbing until he
was twenty years old, Black was not poor. Soon after his birth
in 1886, his family moved to the county seat where his father's
business prospered, and the family lived comfortably.4 0
Felix Frankfurter was born to Jewish parents in Vienna in
1882. "His family had been socially prominent within the iso-
lated Jewish community; for centuries members of his father's
family had been rabbis," and his uncle, a well-known scholar,
became the head librarian of the University of Vienna.41
Frankfurter's father prepared for the rabbinate but abandoned
the seminary, became a businessman, and brought his family to
America in 1894, when Felix was twelve.42
[Tihe Frankfurters were materially poor. Because they were German,
they settled first in a German neighborhood on the Lower East Side
of Manhattan. In time they accumulated enough money to move up-
town to Park Avenue, which was a somewhat better neighborhood
but was not yet the fashionable section it later became. Frankfurter's
father sold linens from a shop in his home and summers peddled door
to door among estates outside the city. But he was not much of a bus-
inessman and was remembered as a man of "frail health, a dreamy,
charitable soul who enjoyed giving baskets of food to poor
neighbors."
43
Of all the greats, Earl Warren had the least advantaged up-
bringing. He was born in Los Angeles, the son of a Norwegian
immigrant who worked for the Southern Pacific Railroad.'"
When his father was laid off without notice, the family's finan-
cial situation became precarious. Warren could receive no fi-
nancial help from his family and put himself through college.
Warren's egalitarian zeal might plausibly be attributed to
his father's financial difficulties. But other self-made men have
38. Id at 89-90.
39. Frank, Hugo L. Black, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at
2322.
40. Id
41. H. HmscH, THE ENIGMA OF FELiX FRANKFURTER 12-13 (1981).
42. L. BAKER, FEiux FRANKFURTER 19 (1969).
43. Id (quoting Josephson, Jurist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 7, 1940, at 34-44).
44. Lewis, Earl Warren, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at
2727.
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been conservative justices, so the causal chain is unclear.45
Several of the great justices had, for want of a better term,
relatively aristocratic backgrounds by American standards.
Some of the failures also came from unusually prominent fami-
lies. James McReynolds was born and raised on a Kentucky
plantation, in an antebellum environment. 46 Justice Van De-
vanter's great-grandfather had been a gunpowder manufacturer
in the American Revolution. His father was a prosperous law-
yer and abolitionist.47 Harold Burton's father was dean of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.48
Being less famous, the mediocre justices have been studied
less extensively than the great ones. We must therefore be cau-
tious in comparing their biographies. Subject to this caveat, the
failures' origins seem to have been at least slightly more com-
mon than those of the greats. Three of the failures - Min-
ton,49 Butler,50 and Whittaker - were farmboys. "Perhaps no
other justice of the past fifty years had more modest origins"
than Charles Whittaker.51 He was born on a farm in Kansas in
1901 and trapped small animals in order to sell their hides and
supplement the family income. He rode a pony six miles to
school each day until, at age sixteen, when his mother died, he
quit school. For the next three years he continued to trap ani-
mals on his father's farm, saving the money from the hides in
the hope of continuing his education.52
Pierce Butler was born to poor Irish parents in southern
Minnesota just one year after the Civil War. "His father, Pat-
rick Butler, was forced to migrate from Ireland because of the
potato famines, but he came from a well-educated, aristocratic
family which traces its forebears back to 1172, when the
LeBoutilliers first came from France. '53 Despite this ancestry,
Pierce's boyhood was spent "pulling stumps, working in the
45. See, e.g., infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
46. Burner, James C. McReynolds, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2024 [hereafter Burner, McReynolds].
47. Burner, Willis Van Devanter, in 3 L. FRiEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2894 [hereinafter Burner, Van Devanter].
48. CURRENT BIOGRAPHY: WHO'S NEWS AND WHY 81 (A. Rothe ed. 1945).
49. Kirkendall, Sherman Minton, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2699 [hereinafter KirkendaU, Minton].
50. Burner, Pierce Butler, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. IsRAEL, supra note 16, at
2183 [hereinafter Burner, Butler].
51. Friedman, Charles Whittaker, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2517.
52. 1d
53. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 116, 126.
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fields, and milking cows."' ' He "worked his way through
Carleton College by washing milk cans in a dairy . "...-55 He
eventually became a belligerent railroad lawyer5 and a reac-
tionary millionaire.57
James Byrnes's father died before he was born, and his
mother took up dressmaking to feed her family.58 Similarly,
Frederick Vinson's father died when he was young, and his
mother took in boarders to support the family.59
Like Souter, most justices have had fathers who were in
business or a profession.60 This sort of background has, in gen-
eral, produced justices who were rated above-average: 61
Father's Occupation Number of Justices Average Ability Score
Farming 29 2.90
Business 16 3.47
Professional 41 3.22
Labor 5 3.80
Other/Unknown 2 2.50
Most of the justices raised in farming families were ap-
pointed, the authors report, "during the earlier years of the na-
tion's history when farming was the country's primary
occupation." 62 A priori, one might suppose that a farm child-
hood would have been an ideal component of a nominee's
"human resume" during the nineteenth century. Yet as the ta-
ble shows, farm families tended to produce the worst-rated jus-
tices. In contrast, the five justices from a working class
("labor") background had the highest average ratings. The au-
thors caution, however, that "their number is small and any
generalization should be viewed as extremely tentative. '63
B. POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
Souter's parents were not active politically.64 It would be
54. Id-
55. I&
56. Id- at 127-28.
57. I& at 137.
58. Murphy, James F. Byrnes, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note
16, at 2517.
59. CuRRENT BIOGRAPHY: WHO'S NEWS AND WHY 793 (M. Black ed. 1943).
60. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 56.
61. Id-
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Interview with William D'Gregorio, author of The Complete Book of
U.S. Presidents and author of profiles of political and world leaders for Cur-
rent Biography, Sept. 18, 1990.
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plausible to suppose that a political family provides an ideal en-
vironment for a prospective justice. In such a family, the young
justice-to-be might be expected to meet a more diverse class of
people than the average child of his economic class, or at least
to pick up some of the practical wisdom that a "judicial states-
man" requires. In fact, however, the fifty-five justices with "po-
litically active families" had an average ability score of only
3.07, slightly below the 3.32 score of the 41 justices from politi-
cally inactive families.65
Notwithstanding the customary statements to the contrary
by beaming presidents, Supreme Court nominations are never
the result of impartial searches for the "best qualified person."
To anyone of even modest political sophistication, it is obvious
that political connections have been extremely important in de-
termining who is elevated to the Court. One sees this in the bi-
ographies of great justices as well as of failures. On the whole,
however, the justices who were failures had been more politi-
cally active - at least in the formal sense of running for office
- than the great justices. Burton was mayor of Cleveland for
several years, served in a state legislature and also held a seat
in Congress and then in the Senate (1941-1945).66 Byrnes and
Minton were both United States Senators - Byrnes for ten
years (1931-1941)67 and Minton for six (1935-1941).68 Byrnes
also had served in the House of Representatives from 1911 to
1925,69 as did Vinson, in 1924-1929 and 1931-1938.70 Vinson held
a number of appointive positions in the federal government:
Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization (1943-1945),
Administrator of the Federal Loan Agency (1945), Director of
the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (1945) and
Secretary of the Treasury (1945-1946).71
Butler and Whittaker (a Kansas City politician) 72 were ac-
tive in their local bar associations,73 and Butler served as a
hyper-political regent for the University of Minnesota from
65. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 57.
66. THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 177 (C. Goldinger ed. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter SUPREME COURT].
67. Id. at 192.
68. Id- at 196.
69. Id at 192.
70. Id, at 195.
71. Id
72. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 48.
73. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 200; Burner, Butler, supra note 50,
at 2184.
[Vol. 75:635
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1907 to 1924.74
Willis Van Devanter, at twenty-four, left his father's law
firm in Indiana and headed west to seek his fortune in the wild
Territory of Wyoming,75 where "[r]edmen fought with land-
grabbing whites, claim stakers with claim jumpers, cattlemen
with rustlers, sheepmen with cattlemen, while the Union Pa-
cific Railroad laid its hands on everything in sight."76 A re-
sourceful criminal lawyer, Van Devanter secured acquittals for
some colorful gun-slingers.7 7 In a place with few lawyers and
little law, he soon made connections with a wealthy cattle
rancher who was the territorial governor, later a United States
senator.78 This patron, backed in turn by the all-powerful
Union Pacific, "boosted Van Devanter up the political ladder
with a speed only possible in those reckless, carefree days of
the frontier. '79 After two years in Wyoming, at twenty-six, he
was appointed a commissioner to revise the territorial statutes.
A year later he became city attorney of Cheyenne. The follow-
ing year he was elected to the territorial legislature, and at
thirty he became chief justice of the Wyoming Supreme
Court.8 0 Resigning from the court, he re-entered private prac-
tice and later became chairman of the Republican State Com-
mittee, then Wyoming Representative on the Republican
National Committee, then Assistant Attorney General handling
cases for the Public Lands Division of the United States Justice
Department.8 '
James Clark McReynolds ran for Congress in 1896, but lost
and never ran for another office, though he did serve as Attor-
ney General in the Wilson Administration, and as a trust-bust-
74. Burner, Butler, supra note 50, at 2185. Some commentators described
Butler's tenure at Minnesota as
eighteen years of hell for any professor who dared express a liberal
viewpoint or teach anything save old-fashioned fundamentalism. The
University of Minnesota became his university .... With [his] usual
bulldozing tenacity, he wanted to monopolize it. Officials of the uni-
versity he treated as office boys. No instructor was too insignificant
for Butler to pry into his social and economic views.
D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 134.
75. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 188.
76. Id- at 189.
77. Id. at 193.
78. Id- at 189.
79. Id-
80. I& at 189-90.
81. Id. at 190.
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ing Assistant Attorney General under Teddy Roosevelt.8 2
Among the great justices, Marshall, 83 Story,84 and Taney85
all served in their state legislatures. Marshall 86 and Story8 7
also were United States congressmen. Marshall was Minister to
France and Secretary of State.8 8 Black was a United States
Senator from Alabama for ten years.8 9 Hughes was Governor
of New York9° and Warren was Attorney General (1939-1943)
and then Governor of California (1943-1953), 91 as well as a vice-
presidential candidate (1948). Hughes was also a nationally rec-
ognized leader of the New York bar, Secretary of State, and a
candidate for president.92
On the other hand, half of the great justices (Harlan,
Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo and Frankfurter) held no
political offices except of a legal nature. Yet they were not de-
void of political instincts and talents. Stone, for example, had
been a law school dean and United States Attorney General.
Frankfurter was supremely gifted, both at courting men of
power like Franklin Roosevelt and Henry Stimson, and at in-
spiring the students and young lawyers who became his de-
voted proteges. In certain circles, and in certain senses,
Frankfurter was a far more gifted politician than most of those
who win electoral victories.93
Not only is Souter's lack of a "political family" not a handi-
cap, his somewhat reclusive personality does not - on the
slight historical evidence - give cause for concern. McReyn-
olds was a somewhat reclusive (or perhaps just misanthropic)
failure,94 but Holmes and especially Cardozo seem to have been
more or less equally reclusive greats. Cardozo, a lifelong bache-
lor who lived with his sister until her death in 1929,9 5 was
82. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 228; Burner, McReynolds,
supra note 46, at 2025.
83. SUPEME COURT, supra note 66, at 138.
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id. at 147.
86. Id. at 138.
87. Id. at 142.
88. Id. at 138.
89. Id. at 188.
90. Id. at 176.
91. Id. at 197.
92. Id. at 176-77.
93. For a revealing portrait of Frankfurter's personality, see H. HIRSCH,
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981).
94. Burner, McReynolds, supra note 46, at 2023-26.
95. Kaufman, supra note 32, at 2287.
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dubbed "the Hermit Philosopher" by a capitol journalist.96
Other observers described Cardozo as "[q]uiet, mild-mannered,
[with] an almost feminine softness, gentle, shy, courteous,
courtly, lonely, ascetic, saintly."97 He was, however, a much
sought-after speaker, as was Holmes.
Holmes's taste in companions was what some would call
"elitist:" intellectuals like Brandeis, Laski, Frankfurter, and
Leslie Stephen, plus English and New England aristocrats. Yet
he was more diplomatic than many of his brethren, and accord-
ing to one observer "played an important personal role in the
lives of the Nine Old Men. He was a focal point, a common
meeting ground, someone they all loved, even two such diamet-
rically opposite characters as McReynolds and Brandeis."98
There are, it should be obvious, recluses and recluses.
There is no tradition of judicial service in Souter's family.99
According to the experts' ratings, it is helpful to have a judicial
ancestor: the twenty-five justices who did had an average abil-
ity score of 3.36, as contrasted with 3.11 for the justices who did
not.100 Of course this, like the other biographical data, may be
a proxy for some underlying trait like wealth, good genes, or an
intellectual family.
C. GEOGRAPHY, ETHNICITY, AND RELIGION
Justice Souter's critics were correct, according to the ex-
perts, in wondering whether his small-town background will be
a handicap: the forty-one justices from small towns had a score
of only 3.07, almost identical to those from "rural areas" (3.10)
and below those from "urban areas" (3.35).101
A prairie populist might suppose that justices from the
East are less able to comprehend the problems of ordinary
Americans than those from, say, the Midwest. According to the
experts, however, Justice Souter's Eastern background is an ad-
vantage. Justices from the East had an average ability score of
3.60, followed by those from the West (3.33), the South and
Border (2.97) and - finally - the Midwest (2.75). "The superi-
ority of the East," our authors conclude, "is probably due to the
fact that the northeastern United States has always been the
96. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 207.
97. Id-
98. I& at 180-81.
99. Interview with William D'Gregorio, supra note 64.
100. A. BLAUSTEiN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 58.
101. Id at 59.
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center of the nation's best law firms and institutions of legal
education."102
Ethnicity is an even more delicate subject. The relatively
small number (13) of justices with "Continental European"
backgrounds had the best average score (3.60), followed by Eng-
lish/Welsh (55 justices, 3.22 average score) and Scottish/Irish
(27 justices, 2.89 average score). 10 3 The sole justice of African
origin, Thurgood Marshall, received a 3.00 or "average"
rating.104
According to the experts, Justice Souter's Episcopalian'0 5
religious affiliation does not augur well for his likely perform-
ance. The five Jewish justices had an average ability score of
4.40; six Catholics were a distant second (3.33), followed by Sou-
ter's "High Protestant" group (3.13), with "Low Protestants"
coming in last (2.93)..06
D. EDUCATION
Souter's education may enable him to surmount his liabili-
ties. It is helpful, the experts say, to obtain one's pre-legal edu-
cation from a school of high standing 0 7 Souter received a B.A.
in 1961 from Harvard, where he was Phi Beta Kappa L08 and
graduated magna cum laude.'0 9 He studied as a Rhodes Scholar
at Oxford" and then attended Harvard Law School.
As a graduate of Harvard, Souter joins the thirty-eight jus-
tices from a law school of "high standing." Their average abil-
ity score of 3.45 is well above the 2.85 earned by the thirteen
who attended schools of average standing, followed by the 2.73
of those who had only an apprenticeship from an "average
attorney."1 '
Thomas Marshall supervised his son John's education, and
gave him "an early taste for history and poetry."" 2 At twelve,
young John transcribed Pope's Essay on Man, and some of his
102. Id
103. Id at 60.
104. Id
105. 2 WHo's WHO IN AMERICA, 1988-1989, at 2923 (J. Pfister 45th ed. 1989).
106. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 61.
107. Id at 62.
108. Carlson, supra note 14, at 21.
109. Lacayo, A Blank Slate, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 16-18.
110. Id.
111. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERsKY, supra note 5, at 63.
112. L. BAKER, supra note 22, at 12-13.
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moral essays.11 3 As there were no formal schools on the fron-
tier, John's education consisted solely of tutoring by his parents
until, at fourteen, he was sent to a clergyman's school one hun-
dred miles away - a rare opportunity for a frontier boy.114
Later, his father wrote a friend in Edinburgh, Scotland, "re-
questing a tutor for his children, specifically a college graduate
well versed in Greek and Latin, an Episcopalian, and - most
importantly - a gentleman."" 5 The tutor thus obtained was a
deacon, who taught John to read Horace and Livy in Latin.116
He left after a year and thereafter Marshall's only formal edu-
cation consisted of one six-week course of law lectures at the
College of William and Mary."17 He was essentially a self-
taught lawyer, learning the law as he practiced it. L18 His
mental prowess became legendary." 9
Joseph Story quit high school before graduation and sought
early admittance to Harvard. 2 0 In order to be admitted, Story
had to show academic attainment comparable to that of the in-
cumbent freshman class. He accomplished this by self-tutoring,
exhibiting a studious dedication that continued throughout his
"bookish and somewhat isolated college years."'12 He gradu-
ated in 1798, second in his class academically.2 2 During most of
his years as a justice, Story was also a professor of law at
Harvard. A famous scholar who is still remembered for his
Commentaries on the Constitution, Story is credited with hav-
ing established Harvard Law School's reputation.2 3
113. Id at 13.
114. I.
115. Id
116. Id
117. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 138; Johnson, John Marshall, in 1
L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, sura note 16, at 289.
118. Johnson, supra note 117, at 285.
119. Dumas Malone cited William Wirt's The Letters of the British Spy de-
scription of Marshall's intellect:
Marshall enjoyed, Wirt asserts, "one original, and, almost, supernatu-
ral faculty," that "of developing a subject by a single glance of his
mind.... Nor does the exercise of it seem to cost him an effort." He
determined immediately on which side of a question was to be most
advantageously assailed; and "his premises once admitted, the demon-
stration, however distant, follows as certainly, as cogently as inevita-
bly as any demonstration in Euclid."
6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 319 (D. Malone ed. 1933) (citing W.
WIRT THE LETTERS OF THE BRITISH SPY 46-47 (1803)).
120. Dunne, supra note 35, at 435.
121. Id. at 436.
122. Id
123. Id.
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Roger Taney attended the usual one-room, one-teacher ele-
mentary school in his native Maryland.124 Private tutoring pre-
pared him for entrance to Dickinson College in Pennsylvania at
the age of fifteen. He graduated in 1795, at age eighteen, as his
class valedictorian. Taney's legal education consisted of an ap-
prenticeship of three years in the law office of Judge Jeremiah
Chase.125
The first Justice Harlan graduated from Centre College in
Kentucky in 1850 and went on to study law at Transylvania
University, which was then known as "The Harvard of the
West.' 26 He completed his legal education at his father's law
office.
Of the greats, Holmes was the first to graduate from a law
school. He received his undergraduate degree at Harvard in
1861, graduating - like Story before him - as class poet.127
After serving three years with the Harvard Regiment, Holmes
returned to Harvard to study law. After graduation, he prac-
ticed law, edited the American Law Review and the twelfth
edition of Kent's Commentaries. With the publication of The
Common Law in 1881, Holmes became a famous legal scholar
and a professor at Harvard Law.12s
As anyone who has read his published letters knows,
Holmes was extremely cerebral and erudite; it would be hard
to find a law professor who was so well-read in the classics of
literature and political thought. His powers were apparent
before he reached adulthood: "Aged nineteen, in the summer
before Lincoln's election, he wrote a Harvard theme on Al-
brecht Diirer, that, many years after his death, was cited by
Wolfgang Stechow, an eminent German critic, as making Rus-
kin's essay on Diirer sound hazy, hasty, and trivial by
comparison."'1 29
His service as an officer in the Civil War, however, may
have affected him more than any of the thousands of books
that he read. Wounded three times - in the breast at Ball's
Bluff, in the neck at Antietam, and in the foot at Fredericks-
burg - and witness to the slaughter of comrades, Holmes knew
124. Gatell, supra note 16, at 635-36.
125. Id. at 636.
126. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 162.
127. Freund, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 1755.
128. Id. at 1757.
129. Rovere, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in ATLANTIC BRIEF LIVES, supra
note 21, at 373, 374.
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better than most that, in his words, "Civilization rests on the
death of men."'130
Charles Evans Hughes led an extraordinarily isolated
childhood.131 "He was timid, slight, definitely the bookworm
type and had few friends."'1 32 At the age of six, three weeks af-
ter he entered school, he begged his parents to let him continue
his studies at home, submitting to them "Charles E. Hughes's
Plan of Study," which included Herodotus, Homer, and
Virgil.133 His proposal was accepted.1 By the age of eight he
was reading Shakespeare and the Bible from the Greek;135 his
father gave him a Greek New Testament for his birthday.136
His parents' educational slogan was "Be thorough, be thorough,
BE THOROUGH," which he adopted at an early age.137 Hear-
ing that his parents were considering adoption in order to give
their precocious child some companionship, Hughes immedi-
ately informed them that this would be a mistake, because edu-
cation was more important than companionship. 38  He
promised his father that he would not read a novel until he had
finished college, and at thirteen he composed essays on "The
Evils of Light Literature" and "The Limitations of the Human
Mind."'1 9 At fourteen he entered Madison College (now Col-
gate University) with the intention of preparing for the minis-
try,140 but he eventually graduated from Brown University Phi
Beta Kappa in 1881.141 He graduated from Columbia Law
School with highest honors and passed the New York bar exam
with a score of ninety-nine and one half.142 Among his many
adult achievements was a brief stint as a law professor at
Cornell.143
Louis Brandeis's early education was in the Louisville pub-
lic schools until the age of sixteen.144 At that time he went
130. Freund, supra note 127, at 18.
131. G. WHITE, supra note 18, at 254.
132. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 76.
133. Id
134. Hendel, Charles Evans Hughes, in 3 L. FRrEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 1894.
135. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 76.
136. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 82 (1979).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 76.
140. Hendel, supra note 134, at 1894.
141. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 176-77.
142. Hendel, supra note 134, at 1899.
143. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 176-77.
144. Mason, supra note 24, at 2043-44.
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with his parents to Dresden, Germany, and completed two
years of study at the Annen-realschule. He returned to the
United States, and without the benefit of a college education
entered Harvard Law School. In two years, at the age of
twenty, he completed his legal studies, having earned the high-
est average in the school's history.145
Harlan Fiske Stone graduated from Amherst College in
1894, Phi Beta Kappa and president of his class.146 Three years
later he received his M.A. from the same institution. Fellow
students at Columbia Law School, where he graduated in 1898,
predicted that he would one day sit on the Supreme Court.147
Interestingly, Benjamin Cardozo - whose common-law
opinions did so much to enrich legal education - did not gradu-
ate from law school. His early education consisted of home
tutoring from his sister and others, including Horatio Alger,
who was in dire financial straits, and tutored young Benjamin
in return for the Cardozo family's assistance.148 In 1885, at the
age of fifteen, Cardozo entered Columbia College, and finished
at the top of his class with the highest scholastic record in Co-
lumbia's history.149 He then entered Columbia Law School, but
left after two years to go into practice with his brother.1 50 Dur-
ing his Supreme Court years, he rose "at six or earlier every
morning," and - if he had no pressing judicial business - he
liked "nothing better than plowing through a book of history or
philosophy or even a volume of Greek. '15 1
Hugo Black's most important schooling was not formal. He
attended local schools in Ashland, Kentucky, before entering
medical school in 1903.152 He stayed only one year and then ap-
plied for admission to the University of Alabama Law School,
which had a faculty of exactly two professors, neither of whom
fooled around with the new-fangled "case book" method of in-
struction.'5 3 Black by-passed college courses entirely, but nev-
ertheless managed to graduate from law school with honors,1 54
a class officer, commended in the yearbook for his tenacity and
145. Id.
146. SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 186.
147. Id.
148. Kaufman, supra note 32, at 2288; D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note
25, at 215.
149. S. ASCH, supra note 17, at 147.
150. Kaufman, supra note 32, at 2288.
151. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 215.
152. Frank, supra note 39, at 2323.
153. G. DUNNE, supra note 37, at 91.
154. Frank, supra note 39, at 2323.
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urbanity.1 5 5 In 1927, as a new United States senator, he began a
program of self-education, reading voraciously in American and
European history, a habit that persisted throughout his life.'1
Felix Frankfurter was another abnormally bookish
"great." In the Jewish immigrant culture of New York, educa-
tion was the key to achievement. Young Frankfurter sat for
hours at nearby Cooper Union, reading newspaper accounts of
politics and public affairs, listening to debates, and arguing af-
terwards with his friends. Unable to afford the Horace Mann
School, he attended City College, an intensive course that cov-
ered high school and college in five years. While there, "his
major activity was debating, and his arguments . . . were
remembered by classmates as incisive and convincing." 157 He
was also vice president of the senior class, a member of the
chess club, and an assistant editor of a college magazine. After
graduating at nineteen, third highest in his class, he attended
Harvard Law School where he "cut an intellectual swath
through the school, led his class for all three years, edited the
Harvard Law Review, and was graduated in 1906."'15 Frank-
furter subsequently became a famous Harvard Law professor.
Earl Warren attended law school at the University of Cali-
fornia.1 59 According to a biographer, "[h]e had been encouraged
to pursue an education, but had not been conspicuous in his ac-
ademic performance."' 60
Taking the same chronological approach to the failures,
Willis Van Devanter attended Indiana Asbury University (now
DePauw), graduating with a near perfect record in history,
mathematics, Greek, Latin and deportment.16 ' He graduated
from the University of Cincinnati Law School in 1881, second in
his class.16 2
In 1882, James McReynolds graduated from Vanderbilt
University as valedictorian of his class.1 63 While at Vanderbilt
he was editor of the school paper and a prominent debater.16 4
He attended law school at the University of Virginia, graduat-
155. Id
156. Frank, supra note 39, at 2326.
157. L. BAKER, supra note 42, at 20.
158. Id. at 15.
159. Lewis, supra note 44, at 2727.
160. G. WHITE, supra note 18, at 336.
161. Burner, Van Devanter, supra note 47, at 1945.
162. Id.
163. Burner, McReynolds, supra note 46, at 2024.
164. Id.
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ing in fourteen months.165
Neither Pierce Butler 166 nor James Byrnes' 67 received a
law degree. Smarter than the other local farm boys, Butler also
possessed a powerful physique and "became the foremost wres-
tler and bruiser of that neighborhood.' 68 He attended a coun-
try school in Northfield, Minnesota, and was, himself, teaching
school by the age of fifteen. In 1883 he enrolled at Carleton
College and graduated in 1887.169 He then read law for a year
with a St. Paul firm before being admitted to the bar. 70
James Byrnes's education was unconventional for a future
Supreme Court justice. He left school at fourteen to make his
own living.17 ' His mother helped him learn shorthand which
he put to use by entering a competitive examination to become
a court reporter. He won the position and "read the law" while
he worked as a court reporter, passing the South Carolina Bar
in 1903.172
Harold Burton received a B.A. from Bowdoin College and
his law degree from Harvard.173 Fred M. Vinson worked his
way through Centre College, Kentucky, receiving an A.B. in
1909 and his law degree two years later.174 He excelled in his
studies and athletics.175 Sherman Minton graduated at the
head of his class at Indiana University where he was an out-
fielder on the baseball team and a guard on the football team.
He then attended Yale Law School where he continued to ex-
cel. 176 While at Yale he won the Wayland Prize for writing on
constitutional law with a piece that, according to the Washing-
ton Post, was "one of the best ever written at the university."'
177
He also helped to establish the University Legal Aid Society
before graduating in 1916.178
Charles Whittaker's education is also rather unusual in
165. I& at 2025.
166. Burner, Butler, supra note 50, at 2183.
167. Murphy, supra note 58, at 2517.
168. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 126.
169. Burner, Butler, supra note 50, at 2183.
170. Id.
171. Murphy, supra note 58, at 2517.
172. Id.
173. SuPREME COuRT, supra note 66, at 194.
174. Id. at 195.
175. Kirkendall, Fred M. Vinson, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra
note 16, at 2639 [hereinafter Kirkendall, Vinson].
176. CURRENT BIOGRAPHY: WHO'S NEws AND WHY 430 (A. Rothe ed. 1949).
177. Id
178. Id.
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that the first and only institution from which he graduated was
the University of Kansas City Law School in 1924.179 As a
youth he attended a "little white school house" on the corner of
his father's farm in eastern Kansas.8 0 He went to high school
in Troy, Kansas, but in 1917 he quit school when his mother
died. Whittaker was then sixteen years old.' s ' In 1920 he con-
vinced the University of Kansas City Law School to admit him,
agreeing to be tutored in any high school subject in which he
was deficient. From 1920 to 1924 Whittaker attended law
school, went to tutoring sessions, and worked as a messenger
for a Kansas City law firm.182
As this survey suggests, the most highly-rated justices have
usually had extremely impressive intellects and superb aca-
demic records. Somewhat surprisingly, the failures also were
often fine students, although fewer of them appear to have
been awesomely brilliant, and they attended institutions that
were, on average, less distinguished.
It is enormously helpful to have been an academic lawyer.
The fifteen justices who had been law professors at some stage
of their careers183 earned a 4.50, far above the 3.23 of thirty-one
corporate lawyers, the 3.07 of fifty-five lawyer-politicians, and
the 3.00 of six miscellaneous justices.'14 Remarkably, these re-
sults suggest that remoteness from the experiences of ordinary
people is helpful to a justice: professors are better than corpo-
rate lawyers, who in turn are better than politician-lawyers.
We do not know how long Justice Souter will serve, but to
the extent that "greatness" is a measure of influence, a long
tenure on the Court is of course important. This is presumably
why justices who served for 25 or more years had the highest
average ability score (3.75), while those with less than five
years had the lowest (2.44).-85
Summarizing the data, the authors provide a profile of a
nominee with the best prospect of becoming a great justice.
[Hie would be a person raised in a northeastern urban area as a mem-
179. Friedman, supra note 51, at 2893.
180. Id- at 2894.
181. I.
182. Id-
183. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERsKY, supra note 5, at 19. Of these, only Taft
and Frankfurter were teaching at the time of their elevation to the Court. It
should be emphasized that many justices who were essentially practitioners
rather than academics nevertheless were counted as professors because of
brief teaching experiences.
184. Id at 65.
185. Id- at 68.
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ber of a business-oriented family. His ethnic roots could be traced
back to the European continent and he would be Jewish. He would
have received his education from high-quality institutions and would
have experience in the academic community as a legal scholar. He
would have been appointed to the Court at a relatively early age,
without prior judicial experience, and serve in that institution for
more than twenty-five years.
186
This ideal justice, it seems, would be a typical Harvard or
Yale law professor. This justice would have an elite and book-
ish "human resume" and would not have endured the problems
of the average American.
II. EVALUATING THE EVALUATION
There is something faintly comic, in a peculiarly academic
style, about this earnest effort to quantify the ingredients of a
perfect judicial biography. Part of the comedy derives from the
pretensions of social science, and part from the pretensions of
constitutional expertise. It should come as no surprise that the
kind of justice whose performance pleases professors turns out
to have a background, on average, which bears an uncanny re-
semblance to that of many of the best professors. To be sure,
our authors overstated the matter: They ignored the evidence
that working-class origins produce good justices, presumably
because the data was too sparse, yet were willing to generalize
from the equally small sample of Jewish justices.
Of course, bias does not entail error. When Einstein looked
in the mirror, he thought he saw a genius, and he was right. It
is not ridiculous, though it may be mistaken, to suppose that
the same background that makes a good professor also makes a
good justice. At least as conventionally understood, both pro-
fessions require analytical and verbal skills. Nevertheless, the
fact that the great professors' "great justice" tends to be a mir-
ror image of the great professors themselves does suggest the
possibility that the prejudices of the evaluators are as decisive
as the performances of the evaluated. Prejudice quantified is
still prejudice.
A. ACADEMIC BIAS
The most conspicuous personal attribute of the greats is
their collective brilliance. Perhaps professor-evaluators tend to
overestimate the importance of brains, erudition, and even of
the professorial style in opinion-writing: One wonders, for ex-
186. 1d at 69.
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ample, whether a panel of practicing lawyers would have rated
Frankfurter and Cardozo above men like Jackson and Harlan
II, who were lawyers of long experience as well as great intel-
lects. Frankfurter was a defensible - though not inevitable -
choice, but the selection of Cardozo, who served only briefly
and left no large imprint on the law, was surely due either to
his pre-Court reputation, some sort of bias of the evaluators, or
both.
There is some evidence in the ratings of what Allen Tate
called "provincialism in time." Most of the great justices (and
all of the failures) served during the twentieth century. The
six "below-average" justices all served sometime between 1791
and 1895, and so did most of the "average" justices. In short,
the evaluators had more extreme opinions about relatively re-
cent justices. To some degree, this may reflect the evaluators'
preoccupation with modern issues. Apart from three or four fa-
mous Marshall opinions, law professors rarely encounter
Supreme Court decisions of the nineteenth-century. Their
casebooks are loaded with recent decisions, and few of them are
competent to evaluate nineteenth century justices. Even his-
torians and political scientists are likely to care more about
modern issues, and in consequence to react more strongly to
modern justices. Then too, the Court's role in the twentieth
century has been greater than in the nineteenth, magnifying
the virtues and vices - real or imagined - of every justice.
B. PoLr cAL IDEOLOGY
Did political ideology affect the ratings? The Walker-
Hulbery essay says nothing about the political inclinations of
the evaluators and very little about those of the justices. The
evaluators, we are given to understand, are dispassionate ex-
perts, and the great justices came from a wide spectrum of
political affiliations. "None of the parties," say the authors in
passing, "can lay claim to producing the most superior justices
... ,"187 This assertion is buttressed by a table showing that
the highest average ability score (4.00) was earned by the one
Whig justice, followed by seven Democratic-Republicans (3.29),
thirty-three Republicans (3.27), forty-two Democrats (3.10) and
thirteen Federalists (3.00).18s
If one probes a little deeper, a different picture emerges.
187. Id at 64.
188. Id-
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Party affiliations are not reliable indicators of political ideol-
ogy. Relatively conservative Southern Democrats like McReyn-
olds and Byrnes should not be lumped together, for ideological
purposes, with zealous liberals like William 0. Douglas. Fur-
thermore, a justice's private political ideology is not necessarily
indicative of whether his jurisprudence in the long run served
liberal or conservative political causes. As private citizens,
Holmes and Stone were Republicans, basically conservative in
economic matters,18 9 but their philosophy of judicial restraint
in property rights cases, coupled with their regard for civil lib-
erties, 190 made them heroes to progressives. Federalist though
he was, John Marshall eventually became an idol of many lib-
eral law professors, who forgave him for his property-rights de-
cisions, largely because nationalistic opinions like McCulloch v.
Maryland'91 laid the legal foundation for the New Deal and,
later, civil rights legislation, while his loose constructionist
maxims were cited in justification of "liberal" decisions. 92
With these complexities in mind, let us reexamine the ex-
perts' list of great justices. Almost without exception, 9 3 these
justices helped to advance at least one - more often, two or
189. A Coolidge appointee, Stone was an intimate of Herbert Hoover. Ac-
cording to a 1936 account, he "did not approve of many New Deal policies
. " D. PEARSON & R. ATLEN, supra note 25, at 110. Like Stone, Holmes was
sometimes mistaken for a liberal because of his civil liberties opinions and his
unwillingness to declare labor legislation unconstitutional, but he was pri-
vately skeptical of efforts to deal with poverty by legislation. See, e.g.,
HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS 42, 49, 51-52, 165, 921 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
190. Stone's famous footnote number four in United States v. Carolene
Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), is one of the seminal texts of modern liberal
jurisprudence. Holmes's record as a defender of civil liberties was more une-
ven, but compared to other members of his Court he was regarded as a great
libertarian. See Bryden, Mencken and Holmes, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 277,
282-83 (1985).
191. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
192. E.g., Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
193. Frankfurter, though critical of what he regarded as the excessive lib-
eral activism of Justices like Murphy, Black, Douglas, and Warren, devoted
most of his career to progressive causes, and was in most respects an orthodox
liberal of his time, albeit - like many people - a bit behind the times in his
last decades. Writing in 1936, the liberal journalists Pearson and Allen de-
scribed Hughes as "a weak-kneed oscillator between the two wings of the
Court ... ." D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 97. Concerning his
first tenure on the Court, however, they had nothing but praise: He "upheld
social, labor and anti-trust measures," "championed the right of federal and
state governments to regulate utilities, railroads and industry" and so on. "In
the six years that he served on the Court," they report, "he voted with the lib-
eral wing 51 times, with the conservatives only 10 times, as against a record for
Justice Holmes of 37 votes on the liberal side and 32 on the conservative." Id
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three - of these major causes on the modern liberal agenda:
transfer of power from the states to the national government;
development of a welfare state; and expansion of civil rights
and liberties, exclusive of property rights. Within the field of
constitutional history, all three of these causes are so sacred,
and so rarely challenged, that they have acquired the aura of
incontestable progress, rather than being seen as large and
complex phenomena whose import is sometimes problematic or
even harmful.1 94
The second Justice Harlan, widely considered (even by lib-
erals) to have been the finest legal craftsman on the Warren
Court, was "near great" rather than "great." One might try to
explain .this on the ground that, since the Court's majority was
liberal, Harlan was not highly influential. But Cardozo, who
served only from 1932-1938, was rated "great," and the rela-
tively undistinguished Justice Fortas, after serving only from
1965-1969, became "near great," as did his fellow liberal Wiley
Rutledge (1943-1949). Harlan's grandfather, the first Justice
Harlan, was "great," we suspect, mainly because he dissented in
Plessy v. Ferguson 95 and The Civil Rights Cases.196 His analyt-
ical skills were inferior to those of his grandson, and he was not
conspicuously influential. None of the infliential conservative-
activist justices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies was "great": Field and Bradley, for example, were only
"near great."
The list of eight "failures" is even more revealing. All of
the failures served during a pivotal fifty-year period of the
Court's history, spanning the final battles involving conserva-
tive activism on behalf of property rights and the subsequent
emergence of a liberal-activist bloc that eventually became a
majority during the Warren Court years. Every failure be-
longed to one of two groups: the conservative-activists who re-
at 80. His record as an efficient chief justice may also have influenced some of
the evaluators. See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 5, at 43.
Concerning Taney, our authors offer this justification of his selection:
"The selection of Roger B. Taney reflects the judgment of experts that a jurist
with outstanding skill and competence should not be rated on the basis of the
negative view which history has affixed to one of his decisions." Id. at 41.
They add that Taney "proved willing to deny the states the power to obstruct
federal processes, thus enhancing the stature which the Court had achieved
under Marshall." Id- at 42.
194. See Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. Co mNENTARY 281, 323-26
(1984).
195. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
196. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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sisted the New Deal, or the moderate-restraintists who, in the
1940s and 1950s, served as a drag on the emerging and finally
dominant liberal-activist wing of the Court. Thus, the jurispru-
dential sin of the first group was conservative activism, and of
the second, conservative restraint.
Of the four conservative-activist justices who most regu-
larly voted to invalidate New Deal legislation, three (Van De-
vanter, McReynolds, and Butler) were "failures." In the
postwar era, Whittaker and Burton - two more failures -
were considered conservative, though of a less activist type.197
Whittaker proved unequal to the Court's tasks and soon re-
signed. Burton, however, was a capable judge who probably
would have received a higher rating had he been a liberal-ac-
tivist, or served during an earlier decade, such as the 1930s,
when his deference to legislators would have been regarded as
a virtue. Like other Democrats, Vinson generally supported a
strong federal government. By the time he reached the Court,
however, this virtue was taken for granted; the constitutional-
ity of the New Deal was no longer in doubt. On Vinson's Court,
the only activist justices were liberals, and compared to them
he was thought to be too passive. After Murphy and Rutledge
were replaced, Vinson was part of a dominant bloc that liberals
criticized as "cautious" about race relations and that "rarely
ruled in favor of individual freedom. '198 Similarly, Minton -
though a militant New Dealer - became one of the most con-
servative members of the postwar Court.199 Byrnes was moder-
ately libertarian in Bill of Rights cases, but in comparison to
the more liberal members of his Court he often seemed insensi-
tive to civil liberties,200 and his post-Court record as a segrega-
tionist governor further tainted his reputation.
The lowest rating any liberal activist received was "aver-
age," or two notches above the failures: Justices Murphy,
Goldberg, and Thurgood Marshall received this rating.201
All told, nine of the evaluated justices are strongly identi-
fied with liberal activism: in addition to the three "average"
197. Kirkendall, Harold Burton, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL supra note
16, at 2619; Friedman, supra note 51, at 2896. Blaustein and Mersky noted that
"Whittaker cast the deciding vote in forty-one crucial decisions, each time
standing on the side that would deny civil rights or the extension of personal
liberty." A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERsKY, supra note 5, at 48.
198. Kirkendall, Vinson, supra note 175, at 2644.
199. Kirkendall, Minton, supra note 49, at 2699.
200. Murphy, supra note 58, at 2527.
201. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MEESKY, supra note 5, at 39.
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justices, there are Fortas (near great), Brennan (near great),
Rutledge (near great), Douglas (near great), Warren (great)
and Black (great). The average ability score of this bloc was
3.89. This means that the explanatory power of a liberal-ac-
tivist record is superior to any of the predictors emphasized by
the authors except Jewishness and being a professor, two cate-
gories that to some degree overlap political liberalism. 20 2 If we
add Brandeis to the "liberal activist" list, as perhaps we
should,203 its average score becomes 4.00. Adding the Federalist
and Republican justices who were celebrated chiefly for their
contributions to liberal jurisprudence - Marshall, Holmes, and
Stone - would raise the average even higher, to 4.23, far above
even such supposedly signifigant predictors as whether the jus-
tice attended a prestigious law school.
It is equally important to stress that the professors who did
the evaluations obviously tried hard to be non-partisan; they
gave considerable - some would say excessive - weight to in-
tellect and traditional lawyers' skills. Most of the greats had
superlative legal minds. In contrast, whatever one may think
of their politics and their votes, none of the "failures" wrote
many impressive constitutional opinions; McReynolds and Van
Devanter did not even do their fair share of the Court's
work.20 4 Although Warren was "great," (mainly, one supposes,
because of his role as leader of the Warren Court) and Douglas
"near great" (perhaps partly because he served so long and ulti-
mately prevailed on so many issues), other liberals whose judi-
cial opinions were often criticized for lack of legal craft were
rated only average. The lackluster conservative Justice Suther-
land received a surprisingly high rating of "near great," per-
haps on the theory that he was influential, or because he wrote
the opinion in some famous cases, or simply to give some repre-
sentation to the twentieth-century conservatives. Despite his
infamous Dred Scott 20 5 opinion, Taney was rated "great."
Plainly, judicial craftsmanship was a factor, although not
202. There have been no strongly conservative, Jewish justices.
203. Brandeis earned his reputation for judicial restraint mainly in eco-
nomic regulation cases, where that position coincided with the liberal political
position. In the field of civil liberties, he was basically activist. See Louis
Leventhal Jaffee, "Was Brandeis an Activist?," speech delivered at the Uni-
versity of Louisville School of Law on the fiftieth anniversary of Justice Bran-
deis's appointment to the Supreme Court (Jan. 28, 1966).
204. See A. BLAuSTEiN & R. MEEsKY, supra note 5, at 48.
205. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1854).
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enough to lift even consummate lawyers like Harlan II or Rob-
ert Jackson to the highest level of excellence.
A panel of conservative scholars probably would have
reached some of the same conclusions. Because most conserva-
tives today advocate judicial restraint, this hypothetical panel
probably would have agreed with liberals in rating Butler, Van
Devanter, and McReynolds near the bottom of the pack. Con-
servatives would be loathe to conclude, however, that Fortas
and Douglas were "near great" justices, even if they reluctantly
conceded - as they might - that Warren and Black were
"great" because of their historical impact.
The problem is not that political bias improperly distorted
the evaluations, but that political bias inevitably and properly
affects evaluations of justices. To be sure, the idea of non-parti-
san ratings of justices is not wholly misguided. After all, even
presidential candidates can to some extent be evaluated on the
basis of politically neutral criteria like administrative experi-
ence. But how many people vote for a president on that basis?
We need to remind ourselves that justices are not merely opin-
ion-writers; they also vote. One may argue about the precise
mix of law and politics in constitutional judging, but the stub-
born fact remains: If you usually like the way a justice votes,
you will not regard his or her performance on the Court as
abysmally poor or even below average. It would be indefensible
for a liberal professor, sympathetic to judicial activism, to rate
Douglas lower than Harlan, however much he might admire
the latter's legal craft. If anything, today's professors would
give greater weight to politics than the 1970 panel did. We sus-
pect that a similar survey today would rate Brennan "great"
and would have less esteem for Frankfurter and Taney than
the experts of 1970.
III. THE RESUME MENTALITY
What, then, shall we say about the concept of a "human re-
sume" for Supreme Court nominees? The first and most im-
portant thing to say is that all resumes - whether legal,
academic, or "human" - are extremely superficial. A resume
reveals little about character, and less about wisdom. Every
fall, the faculty hiring committee at Harvard Law School looks
at several resumes that are about as impressive as Felix Frank-
furter's was, but how many Frankfurters do they hire? Of
course, no one proposes to evaluate nominees solely by perus-
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ing resumes, but equally superficial appraisals abound, on both
sides, in every confirmation debate.
If one's main interest is in the legal quality of a justice's
opinions, there is no reason to believe that non-legal biogra-
phies furnish useful predictors. No one who thought that a
nominee's legal and political credentials were impressive would
even consider opposing him on the ground that he was a Bap-
tist who grew up on a farm in Iowa and went to an obscure law
school. The fallacy in using such predictors is not that they are
imperfect; all predictors are imperfect. But once we know
someone's qualifications we no longer care about predictors of
those qualifications. There is nothing in the data discussed in
this Essay that refutes the possibility that the nominees with
"ideal" biographical data who became highly-rated justices are
the same people that a competent observer would have ex-
pected to be great without considering such data. Few if any of
the greats would have looked better, when nominated, on the
basis of their "human resumes" than on the basis simply of
their legal and political qualifications.
If one is chiefly interested in the political soundness of a
justice's votes, why rely on an ostensibly neutral criterion like
the nominee's class origins or non-legal experiences? A liberal
hermit will be as suitable (or unsuitable) as a liberal labor law-
yer. So even if the data showed that justices from a particular
background are more likely to vote in certain ways than jus-
tices of different origins, there would be no reason to prefer a
nominee with that background to one with the opposite back-
ground who was known to have the same political and jurispru-
dential convictions.
It is only when we are uncertain about the nominee's polit-
ical opinions that there is any reason to consider biographical
data - not because of its intrinsic significance, but because of
its value in predicting political inclinations. Common experi-
ence tells us that if all we know about a nominee is that he was
a corporate lawyer, then we should conclude that he is likely to
be more conservative than someone, for example, about whom
we know only that she was a professor of constitutional law.
Many similar inferences are equally reasonable generalizations,
albeit inaccurate in some cases. Even so, history reveals the
dangers of facile predictions that someone from this or that
background will have this or that inclination as a justice.
This is particularly true in the area of race relations. Con-
trary to what some who opposed Souter implied, proximity to
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another race is not generally conducive to conciliatory atti-
tudes: consider Jerusalem and New York. Professors, who as a
rule have very little contact with poor blacks, have generally
supported affirmative action and other programs that are less
popular among whites in racially heterogeneous areas. If Jus-
tice Souter proves to be less liberal than a Rockefeller, it will
not be because he has led a more sheltered life.
In any event, it is difficult to distinguish the question
whether a Supreme Court nominee is well-prepared to under-
stand the problems of the poor from the question whether he
or she in fact understands the problems of the poor. Brandeis
is a good example. His life was far removed from that of the
average American, yet he had much practical experience in
dealing with industrial disputes - no more so, however, than
some company lawyers of conservative views. Many believe
that Brandeis had an acute, even inspiring, understanding of
workers, citizenship, and business. Certainly his factual mas-
tery of economic problems was dazzling. But it is not at all
clear that he exemplifies the value of any particular type of ex-
perience. For one thing, some of his causes look less attractive
today. He was a devout believer in such eighteenth-century vir-
tues as individual responsibility and states' rights,20 6 notions
that sounded somewhat old-fashioned even in his time, and that
are now firmly identified with conservativism. Was he "well-
prepared" to understand those subjects? His efforts to obtain
judicial approval of protective labor laws for women in his fa-
mous "Brandeis briefs" have often been cited as illustrative of
Brandeis's understanding of real-world conditions, but those
laws are no longer thought of as an unmixed blessing, even by
liberals who have no qualms about most government regula-
tions. 20 7 So should we describe Brandeis as well-prepared to
understand the problems of working women? Evidently not,
though his contemporary allies thought him the very paragon
of a well-prepared justice.
Although Brandeis's practical experiences may indeed have
enhanced his understanding of various subjects, his contribu-
tion to constitutional law consisted chiefly of opinions espous-
ing judicial restraint in the area of economic regulation and
206. See Mason, supra note 24, at 2043-59.
207. See generally, Bryden, supra note 194 (arguing that the factual portion
of the "Brandeis briefs" are less compelling than previous accounts had de-
scribed them).
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vigilant protection of civil liberties - positions that were also
commonly held by inexperienced schoolteachers.
Holmes moved in the rarefied environment of an intellec-
tual aristocrat, and - apart from the Civil War - servants
were probably the common men he knew best. As for the war,
that horror may have made Holmes more, rather than less, cal-
lous about human suffering.20 8 Yet he usually voted with Bran-
deis, albeit sometimes with different motives. A detached,
philosophic man, who found "facts" boring, Holmes believed
that big corporations were inevitable, while Brandeis - whose
mind was a virtual encyclopedia of economic facts - crusaded
for small business, a cause that has perpetual appeal, like world
government, but that looks even more quixotic today than it
did in Brandeis's time. Sometimes a coldly judicious mind is
more valuable than a lifetime of passionate experience.
Frankfurter was a professor through and through, but he
did not lead a cloistered life, and some would characterize him
as well-versed in social realities. On the other hand, if we say
that his pre-Court life manifested "concern for the poor," how
do we reply to someone who says that concern is no substitute
for good policies? Depending on the observer's convictions
about the merits of the controversies, Frankfurter's exper-
iences on behalf of the minimum wage and similar causes will
seem to be either "fine training" for a justice or symptomatic of
trendy enthusiasm for the fads of the intelligentsia.
The concept of a human resume is reminiscent of the old
conservative clich6 that a politician who has "never met a pay-
roll" is unfit to govern. That particular theory is rarely heard
these days, perhaps because there are too few conservative poli-
ticians with standing to propose it. But conservative jurists
have sometimes entertained analogous thoughts, as revealed in
a liberal journalist's 1936 account of Justice Butler's attitude to-
ward his liberal brethren:
One reason for Butler's scorn for his liberal colleagues is that
they stepped out of the cloistered atmosphere of the college or of re-
mote-control law practice onto the bench without first making their
mark fighting at the lower bar. Both he and Roberts spent the early
years of their life as jury pleaders. Van Devanter, Sutherland and
McReynolds also came to the Court as practicing attorneys, although
their rough-and-tumble pleading was not so extensive. But all of
them look down upon the qualifications of Cardozo, who they con-
sider jumped from college to a very select law practice and then to
208. See S. NovIcK, HONORABLE JUsTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMS 141 (1989).
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the bench; and upon those of Stone, who jumped from the deanship of
Columbia Law School almost immediately to the bench; and upon
those of Brandeis, who, although a practicing lawyer, had spent years
in liberal crusades before he came to the Court. Hughes they consider
a middle-of-the-road Y.M.C.A. Baptist with an evangelical outlook
who entered the legal profession at the top, handling only the great
cases and keeping carefully aloof from the school of hard knocks in
the police and common-pleas courts.
None of this, in the opinion of Butler, is the experience that qual-
ifies a man to pass on acts of Congress and the legislation of states as
a member of the highest court of the land.20 9
Like Souter's critics, Justice Butler sincerely believed that
his ideological foes were ill-prepared for their responsibilities.
Would he have been quite so emphatic if his inexperienced col-
leagues had been right-wing professors who voted on his side
and treated him with respect? And would liberals invoke the
concept of a human resume to defeat the nomination of a rosy-
cheeked liberal professor from a hamlet in New Hampshire?
Why should they?
No judge has an adequate human resume, and so none will
excel without the ability to transcend his apparent limitations.
Thurgood Marshall, an elderly black, male lawyer, must try to
understand young, white businesswomen; Sandra Day
O'Connor, a sober, white, law-abiding, female lawyer, must
somehow fathom an alcoholic, male, Hispanic criminal defend-
ant. The patrician Holmes had to comprehend labor unions;
Earl Warren, a politician, was called upon to understand
soldiers and stockbrokers; Hugo Black, from Clay County, Ala-
bama, had to appreciate life in the slums of Detroit; and John
Marshall, from the woods of eighteenth-century Virginia, had
to possess a vision of the great, commercial nation that we
would become.
The justices have not always governed wisely. But if their
human resumes had been a fair measure of their judicial limita-
tions, they would never have done so.
209. D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 136.
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